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Abstract 
 
The present article analyses the provisions of the 2006 Semipalatinsk Treaty 
establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia, explores their 
different nature and compares them with those contained in the Treaties of 
Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba. The fundamental question to 
be answered is whether the Semipalatinsk Treaty will effectively contribute to 
the non proliferation of nuclear weapons. The article concludes that the treaty 
contains lights and shadows: although some positive innovations have been 
included in the final text, there are loopholes that might weaken the 
denuclearization regime. The “Great Game” in Central Asia and the tight 
relations of the regional states with the Russian Federation might also hamper 
the efforts to obtain the support of the other nuclear powers.  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
1. According to the UN General Assembly Resolution 3472 (XXX) B of 11 
December 1975, a nuclear weapon-free zone is “any zone, recognized as such by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of States in the free 
exercise of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention 
whereby: (a) the statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall 
be subject, including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined; (b) an 
international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance 
with the obligations deriving from that statute”. 1  In drafting this definition, the 
                                                          
  PhD, University of Rome “La Sapienza”; Reader, School of Law, University of 
Westminster; Visiting Lecturer, Queen Mary University of London and King’s College London. 
E-mail: mroscini@iol.it. I am grateful to Dr. Yoshifumi Tanaka for reading and commenting a 
previous version of this article. The usual caveat applies. This article is based on developments 
as of April 2008 and all websites were also last visited on that date. 
1  On this definition, see Sandra Szurek, Zones exemptes d’armes nucléaires et 
zones de paix dans le tiers-monde, 88 Revue générale de droit international public (1984), 200-
203. Art. VII of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 
recognizes the role of nuclear weapon-free zones by providing that “[n]othing in this Treaty 
affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total 
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General Assembly took inspiration from the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had been 
opened for signature in 1967.2 
2. In 1976, a group of experts appointed by the Conference of the Committee 
on Disarmament presented a comprehensive study setting out the principles that 
should be taken into account in order to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone.3 
According to the study, disarmament obligations may be assumed not only by large 
groups of states, but also by smaller groups and even by individual countries; the 
agreement must ensure the absence of nuclear weapons in the region; the initiative 
for the creation of the nuclear weapon-free zone should come from the regional 
states and participation must be voluntary; all regional states (and in particular those 
militarily significant) should ideally participate in the initiative; an effective system of 
verification of compliance must be set up in the agreement; cooperation on all 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be promoted; and the treaty should be of 
unlimited duration4. 
                                                                                                                                      
absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories”. 
2  The Treaty of Tlatelolco provides for the establishment of a nuclear weapon-
free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean and was opened for signature on 14 February 
1967. It entered into force after the conditions contained in Art. 29 (1) were met, i.e. with 
Cuba’s ratification (23 October 2002). The regional states could however waive, wholly or in 
part, those requirements by means of a declaration annexed to their respective instruments of 
ratification and which could be formulated at the time of deposit of the instrument or 
subsequently. For those states, the treaty entered into force upon deposit of the declaration, or 
as soon as those requirements were met which have not been expressly waived (Art. 29 (2)). 
The numeration of articles of the Treaty of Tlatelolco takes into account the amendment 
adopted by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (OPANAL) General Conference on 26 August 1992 (Res. 290 (E-VII)). 
3  Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All 
Its Aspects (Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament), UN Doc. 
A/10027/Add. 1, New York, 1976 [hereinafter “1976 Comprehensive Study”], Annex I. 
4  Ibid., para. 90. The United States has drafted its own list of requirements that 
the nuclear weapon-free zones must possess to obtain Washington’s support: 1) the initiative 
should come from the regional states concerned; 2) all important regional states should 
participate; 3) the agreement should provide for an effective verification of compliance 
mechanism; 4) the establishment of the zone should not disturb existing security arrangements 
and the right of individual or collective self-defence; 5) the treaty should effectively prohibit the 
development, acquisition and possession of nuclear devices for any purpose;  6) the nuclear 
weapon-free zone states should be free to decide whether to grant or deny transit privileges 
within their land, sea and air territory; 7) no restrictions should be imposed on the exercise of 
rights provided by international law, in particular those related to navigation (Eleanor C. 
McDowell (ed.), Digest of United States Practice in International Law (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of State Publications, 1976), 728-729). These criteria were reaffirmed during the 
Tashkent Conference of 15-16 September 1997 
(<http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/shared/canwfz/usstate.htm>). China has also indicated its 
criteria during the Tashkent conference: in particular, nuclear weapon-free zone treaties should 
be consistent with the principles and purposes of the UN Charter and should not lead to 
interferences in the internal affairs of states outside the region; the nuclear weapon-free status 
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3. On 30 April 1999, the UN Disarmament Commission adopted by 
consensus and submitted to the UN General Assembly a report that revises and 
updates the 1976 study in the light of the Treaties of Rarotonga, Bangkok and 
Pelindaba.5 These non-binding guidelines, like those of 1976, are meant to guide 
states in establishing nuclear weapon-free zones but cannot be regarded as exhaustive 
or be interpreted in such a way as to prejudice the setting up of a nuclear weapon-free 
zone.6 
4. It has been argued that the nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia has 
been conceived in accordance with the above mentioned principles and guidelines.7 
The idea of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia dates back to 1992, when 
Mongolia declared itself a denuclearized state and manifested its support for other 
regional disarmament measures, such as a nuclear weapon-free zone. 8  The first 
                                                                                                                                      
should not be conditional on other security mechanisms; the zone should have clear 
geographical boundaries and an effective verification mechanism including the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s safeguards; and nuclear weapon states should provide 
adequate negative security assurances (Li Jinxian, Principles for the Establishment of New 
Zones, 20 (1) Disarmament: A periodic review of the United Nations (1997), 109-110). 
5  Establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones on the Basis of Arrangements 
Freely Arrived at Among the States of the Region Concerned (A/54/42, Annex I) [hereinafter 
“Report of the Disarmament Commission”], 24 United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 
(1999), 248-254. The report was eventually adopted by the General Assembly (UN Doc. 
A/RES/55/56 A). The treaty establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in the South Pacific 
Ocean was signed on 6 August 1985 (fortieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima) in 
Rarotonga (Cook Islands), and entered into force on 11 December 1986 with the deposit of the 
eighth instrument of ratification. The end of the Cold War, the consequent closure of the US 
military bases in the Philippines and the outrage caused by the French nuclear experiments in 
the South Pacific led to the conclusion of the treaty establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in 
South-East Asia, signed in Bangkok on 15 December 1995 by the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states along with Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. The treaty 
entered into force on 27 March 1997 with the ratification of the seventh state. The Pelindaba 
Treaty establishing the African nuclear weapon-free zone, named after the area near 
Johannesburg where the South African nuclear activities had taken place, was opened for 
signature on 11 April 1996. Unlike its predecessors, the African treaty, that will enter into force 
on the date of deposit of the twenty-eighth instrument of ratification, is the result of the 
collaboration between a universal organisation (the United Nations) and a regional one (the 
then Organisation of African Unity). Such cooperation materialized in the creation of a 
commission of experts who contributed to the drafting of the treaty and in the UN technical 
and financial support to the regional states. See Marco Roscini, Le zone denuclearizzate 
(Torino: Giappichelli, 2003), 8-19. 
6  See the words of the South African representative (Disarmament Commission, 
Press Release DC/2641, 30 April 1999, 20). 
7  Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan, 
8 September 2006, at 
<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/pdf_support/060908_ministers_statement.pdf>, 2. 
8  Scott Parrish, Prospects for a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, 8 (1) 
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formal proposal was however put forward the following year by the President of 
Uzbekistan at the United Nations General Assembly.9 It was then jointly supported 
by the regional states in the Almaty Declaration of 27 February 1997 and discussed in 
the Tashkent Conference of September 1997.10 For the first time, the United Nations 
became directly involved in the works to draft a nuclear weapon-free zone treaty.11 
Controversies among the Central Asian states emerged during the negotiations related 
to the delimitation of the borders between certain states, the legal status of the 
Caspian Sea and the close relationship with the Russian Federation. At the end of the 
Samarcanda meeting (25-27 September 2002), the regional states announced that they 
had reached an agreement,12  and, on 8 February 2005, the draft text was finally 
approved in Tashkent. The treaty was opened for signature on 8 September 2006 in 
Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan), a former Soviet nuclear weapons test site permanently 
closed in 1991, and will enter into force thirty days after the deposit of the fifth 
instrument of ratification.13 UN General Assembly Resolution 61/88 of 6 December 
2006 welcomed the signing of the treaty and considered the establishment of the zone 
as “an important step towards strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, 
promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in the 
environmental rehabilitation of territories affected by radioactive contamination, and 
enhancing regional and international peace and security” and as “an effective 
contribution to combating international terrorism and preventing nuclear materials 
and technologies from falling into the hands of non-State actors, primarily terrorists”. 
5. The present article discusses the main features of the Semipalatinsk Treaty 
and investigates whether the treaty will effectively contribute to the non proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. First, the article examines the obligations of the Central Asian 
denuclearized states and explores their different nature. It then goes on to discuss the 
                                                                                                                                      
The Nonproliferation Review (Spring 2001), 142. 
9  Address by Islam A. Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 6th 
Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, 29 September 1993, UN Doc. 
A/48/PV.6, 5 October 1993. 
10  On the attempts to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia, see 
Michael Hamel-Green, Regional Initiatives on Nuclear and WMD-Free Zones. Comparative 
Approaches to Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2005), 12-13; 
Oumirserik Kasenov, On the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, 6 (1) 
The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1998), 144-147; Murat Laumulin, Nonproliferation and 
Kazakistani Security Policy, 5 (3) The Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1998), 127; 
Parrish, above n. 8, 141-148. 
11  Jozef Goldblat, Denuclarization of Central Asia, Disarmament Forum (4) 
(2007), 25. 
12  Disarmament Commission, Press Release DC/2842, 30 September 2002. 
13  All five Central Asian states have signed the Semipalatinsk Treaty, but only 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have ratified it (source: 
<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/pdfs/canwz.pdf>). The English version of the 
Semipalatinsk Treaty can be found at 
<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/pdf_support/060905_canwfz.pdf>. 
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territorial extension of the nuclear weapon-free zone and the grounds for terminating 
and suspending the obligations arising from the treaty. The nuclear weapon states’ 
negative security assurances contained in the annexed protocol and the mechanisms 
to verify and enforce compliance by the states parties are finally analysed. Whenever 
relevant, the differences between the Semipalatinsk Treaty and the other nuclear 
weapon-free zone treaties, as well as with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT), will be highlighted. 
 
II. The Denuclearization Obligations of the States Parties  
 
6. The object of the basic prohibitions contained in the Semipalatinsk Treaty is 
“nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”, defined in Article 1 (b) as “any 
weapon or other nuclear explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, 
irrespective of the military or civilian purpose for which the weapon or device could 
be used”. The devices must thus be “explosive”, i.e. capable of releasing a 
considerable amount of nuclear energy in a very short time and in an uncontrolled 
manner. 14  This excludes from the scope of the prohibitions conventional and 
experimental nuclear reactors, reprocessed nuclear material, depleted uranium 
ammunitions and radiological weapons, which do not cause a blast or heat wave. 
7. There is an important difference between the Treaties of Tlatelolco and 
Bangkok on the one hand, and the Treaties of Rarotonga, Pelindaba and 
Semipalatinsk on the other. While the latter expressly include in the definition of 
“nuclear explosive device” also weapons in unassembled or partly assembled forms 
(thus prohibiting also the production of the weapon components), the former are 
silent on this point: therefore, the prohibitions only apply to completed and ready for 
use devices. All the five treaties, however, specify that the definition of “nuclear 
explosive device” does not include the means of transport or delivery of the 
prohibited weapons or devices if they are separable from and not an indivisible part 
of them. Without the inclusion of this provision, the transit of all vehicles, ships and 
aircraft big and equipped enough to potentially carry nuclear arms would have been 
banned from the zone, regardless of whether or not they actually carried the 
weapons.15 
8. The basic prohibitions contained in the Semipalatinsk Treaty and common 
                                                          
14  See para. III (e) of the note of the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany issued at the moment of the signature of the NPT: “At the present stage of 
technology nuclear explosive devices are those designed to release in microseconds in an 
uncontrolled manner a large amount of nuclear energy accompanied by shock waves, i.e. 
devices that can be used as nuclear weapons” 
(<http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/024a
_NonProliferationNuclearWeapons,0.pdf>). 
15  Alfonso García Robles, El Tratado de Tlatelolco: génesis, alcance y propósitos 
de la proscripción de las armas nucleares en la América latina (México: El Colegio de México, 
1967), at XXIV. 
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to all nuclear weapon-free zone treaties are the prohibition to manufacture, acquire, 
possess or otherwise control nuclear explosive devices and the prohibition of 
stationing those devices within the zone (Article 3 (1)). The possession of nuclear 
explosive devices is prohibited for states parties anywhere, not only on their 
territories, but also abroad, e.g. in a military base situated in an allied country not 
included in the nuclear weapon-free zone. Not only formal possession, but also 
control is prohibited, for instance through a puppet government controlled “by any 
means” by the denuclearized state. If the relationship between the two states is not of 
subordination but of cooperation, for instance in the context of a military alliance, 
one might ask whether this participation involves some kind of control over the 
alliance’s explosive devices and thus violates the nuclear weapon-free zone treaty. 
During the drafting of the 1976 Comprehensive Study, several experts argued that 
“such alliances should not be regarded as being in all cases competitive with nuclear-
weapon-free zones”.16 The answer would thus depend on the circumstances of each 
case: if “a treaty or alliance […] does not envisage nuclear retaliation in support of an 
ally, nor include the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of that ally”, then 
it would be “no bar to the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone” and in such a case 
“a non-nuclear weapon State allied to a nuclear-weapon State can […] also be a party 
to a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty”. 17  In order to avoid assuming conflicting 
obligations, the denuclearized state should however verify that the nuclear weapon-
free zone treaty is not in contrast with other agreements to which it is a party.18 
9. The other fundamental provision common to all nuclear weapon-free zone 
treaties is the prohibition of stationing nuclear explosive devices within the zone, 
which is defined in Article 1 (c) of the Semipalatinsk Treaty as “implantation, 
emplacement, stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment”.19 This prohibition 
                                                          
16  See the 1976 Comprehensive Study, above n. 3, Annex I, para. 92. This 
conclusion was reasserted by several delegations, including the Italian one (ibid., Annex II, para. 
132). 
17  1976 Comprehensive Study, above n. 3, Annex I, para. 92. According to the 
Federal Republic of Germany, however, “we do not want to imply a priori that simultaneous 
membership of a military alliance and of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is impossible in theory. 
But, in our view, such a simultaneous membership would give rise to considerable and 
practically insurmountable difficulties” (ibid., Annex II, para. 116). 
18  Report of the Disarmament Commission, above n. 5, para. 32. This reference 
to the compatibility with previous international and regional agreements was deemed necessary 
by the US, British, French and Polish delegates (Disarmament Commission, Press Release 
DC/2641, 30 April 1999, 10-12, 22). 
19  The definition is identical to that contained in Art. 1 (d) of the Bangkok Treaty. 
Art. 1 (d) of the Pelindaba Treaty and Art. 1 (d) of the Rarotonga Treaty also include in the 
definition of stationing the “transport on land or inland waters”. While in the Bangkok Treaty 
transport by states parties is the object of a specific prohibition (even though it is not qualified 
as a form of stationing), no prohibition of transport is contained in the Semipalatinsk Treaty. 
The Treaty of Tlatelolco, without using the word “stationing”, prohibits “the receipt, storage, 
installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons, directly or 
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constitutes the main difference between the nuclear weapon-free zone treaties and the 
NPT. Not necessarily does the prohibition of possession assumed by a state involve 
the denuclearization of its territory. Indeed, the NPT allows China, France, the 
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to deploy nuclear 
weapons on the territory of non-nuclear weapon states parties, providing that the 
latter do not have control over them. On the contrary, the Treaties of Tlatelolco, 
Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk prohibit the presence of nuclear 
explosive devices within the zones, whoever owns or controls them. This was one of 
the problems that blocked the negotiations for the establishment of the Central Asian 
nuclear weapon-free zone. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are in 
fact bound, together with the Russian Federation, by the 1992 Tashkent Collective 
Security Treaty, Art. IV of which provides that the parties will give each other all 
assistance necessary, including military assistance, in response to aggression. 20 
According to Russian officials, this provision allows the deployment of Russian 
nuclear weapons on the territory of the other parties if, after a joint decision, this was 
deemed necessary. 21  In the opinion of the United States, United Kingdom and 
France, on the other hand, if so interpreted the provision would undermine the 
central purpose of establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone. 22  Article 12 (1) was 
eventually included in the final text, providing that the Semipalatinsk Treaty “does 
not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties under other international treaties 
which they may have concluded prior to the date of the entry into force of this 
Treaty”.23 At first sight, this appears to be a clause under Article 30 (2) of the 1969 
                                                                                                                                      
indirectly” (Art. 1).  
20  In 2002, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was founded, of 
which only Turkmenistan is not a member (Uzbekistan rejoined in 2006 after deciding in 1999 
not to prolong its participation). Common military exercises were carried out in 2005 and, in 
October 2007, the creation of a peacekeeping force was agreed. The CSTO states have also 
increased their cooperation within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), which led to large-scale joint military exercises in 2007 (Martha Brill Olcott, Strategic 
Concerns in Central Asia, Disarmament Forum (4) (2007), 11). Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are also members of the SCO, along with China and Russia (Iran has 
applied for membership on 24 March 2008). It has been observed that “the heyday of US 
military influence in the [Central Asia] region, and likely that of NATO as well, does seem to 
have passed, at least for the foreseeable future” and that the present trend is towards increased 
security cooperation with the Russian Federation (ibid.). 
21  Parrish, above n. 8, 146. 
22  Sonia Luthra, Central Asian States Renounce Nuclear Weapons, 36 (8) Arms 
Control Today (October 2006), 
<http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_10/CentralAsian.asp>. 
23  A similar provision is contained in Art. 21 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 
according to which “[n]one of the provisions of this Treaty shall be construed as impairing the 
rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of 
States members of the Organization of American States, under existing regional treaties”. 
However, the reference here is to obligations in the framework of the UN and the 
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ensuring that the provisions of the 
Tashkent Treaty will prevail over those of the Semipalatinsk Treaty, where 
incompatible. Nonetheless, if the Russian interpretation is correct, i.e. if the Tashkent 
Treaty does provide for the right to deploy Russian nuclear weapons on the territory 
of other parties, and if this right is really preserved by Article 12 (1) of the 
Semipalatinsk Treaty, then it would be hard to see how the latter treaty would have 
any meaning at all. Such an interpretation of Article 12 (1) would be absurd and 
unreasonable and in contrast with the principle of effectiveness, according to which 
“a treaty must be given an interpretation that enables its provisions to be ‘effective 
and useful’, that is, to have the appropriate effect”.24 It is thus this writer’s opinion 
that the first paragraph of Article 12 of the Semipalatinsk Treaty should be 
interpreted in the light of the second paragraph, which provides that “[t]he Parties 
shall take all necessary measures for effective implementation of the purposes and 
objectives of this Treaty in accordance with the main principles contained therein”.25 
The combined effect of the two paragraphs of Article 12 is that only those provisions 
of previous treaties that do not prejudice the effective implementation of the 
purposes and objects of the Semipalatinsk Treaty are preserved: therefore, the Central 
Asian denuclearized states parties to the Tashkent Treaty still have an obligation to 
provide military assistance to the other parties (including Russia) in case of 
aggression, but this assistance cannot include the acceptance of nuclear explosive 
devices on their territory.26 Of course, assuming that Russia’s interpretation of Article 
IV of the Tashkent Treaty is correct, the states parties to both the Semipalatinsk and 
the Tashkent Treaties might incur international responsibility under Article 30 (5) of 
the Vienna Convention for the assumption of conflicting obligations. 
10. It is worth mentioning that Article 3 (1) (a) of the Semipalatinsk Treaty 
prohibits not only the manufacture, acquisition, possession, control and stationing of 
nuclear explosive devices but also the conduct of nuclear military research: only the 
Pelindaba Treaty contains a similar prohibition (Article 3), while the other nuclear 
weapon-free zone treaties are silent on this point. 
11. The denuclearized states are bound not only not to carry out the above 
mentioned prohibited activities, but also not to allow the conduct of such activities in 
their territories by anyone (Article 3 (1) (d)) and not to seek or receive assistance or 
take any action to assist or encourage them (Article 3 (1) (b) and (c)). The prohibition 
                                                                                                                                      
Organization of American States (OAS), and not to security agreements. 
24  Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
179. 
25  This second paragraph was subsequently added by the drafters to 
accommodate the criticism of France, United Kingdom and United States, which however 
found this addition insufficient (Goldblat, above n. 11, 29). 
26  Goldblat suggests another possible solution to affirm the compatibility of the 
two treaties, i.e. that they do not have the same subject matter: one prohibits the stationing of 
nuclear weapons within a certain region, the other provides for an obligation to defend an allied 
country. The presence of nuclear weapons on the territory of the attacked state is not necessary 
to defend it, as they could be launched from outside the zone (Goldblat, above n. 11, 30). 
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of assistance cannot however prejudice the cooperation in the field of the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy, even if materials and technology are essentially the same 
(providing of course that no nuclear explosions are carried out). 27  A fortiori, the 
prohibition of assistance should not be interpreted as prohibiting all scientific or 
economic cooperation between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. The 
legislative history of the Rarotonga Treaty clearly shows that the words “not to take 
any action to assist or encourage” do not cover actions having purposes different 
from those prohibited by the treaty but that could incidentally support them.28 There 
appears to be no reason to interpret the Semipalatinsk Treaty differently.29 
12. Apart from the basic prohibitions contained in Article 3, the Semipalatinsk 
Treaty imposes other obligations on the states parties. Article 8 requires them to use 
for exclusively peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are within 
their territory, under their jurisdiction or under their control anywhere and to 
conclude with the IAEA and bring into force a safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153 
(Corr.)) and an Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)) no later than eighteen 
months from the treaty’s entry into force.30 Article 8 also requires the parties not to 
provide source or special fissionable material or related equipment to any non-nuclear 
weapon state unless that state has concluded with the IAEA a comprehensive 
safeguards agreement and related Additional Protocol. 31  The provision of such 
material or equipment to nuclear weapon-states is not prohibited. The Semipalatinsk 
Treaty is the first nuclear weapon-free zone treaty to refer to the 1997 Additional 
Protocol providing for more intrusive and comprehensive verification measures. 
Indeed, under the safeguards system based on INFCIRC/153, the possibility for the 
IAEA to detect clandestine nuclear activities is limited, as inspections focus on 
declared nuclear material and on strategic points in declared facilities. Under the 
Additional Protocol, instead, the IAEA is given the authority to inspect undeclared 
facilities and to access all parts of a state’s nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium 
mines, as well as any other location where nuclear material is or may be present. 
13. Unlike the NPT,32 the Semipalatinsk Treaty also addresses conduct by 
non-state actors. Under Article 9 of the Semipalatinsk Treaty, each state party 
                                                          
27  Art. 7. 
28  Nigel Fyfe and Christopher Beeby, The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone 
Treaty, 17 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review (1987), 41. 
29  Treaties in pari materiæ can be supplementary means of interpretation. 
30  Kazakhstan has research reactors at Almaty and Kurchatov and a fabrication 
unit at Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kyrgyzstan has a processing combine and Uzbekistan has two small 
research reactors near Tashkent (Hamel-Green, above n. 10, 15). On Kazakhstan’s civilian 
nuclear programme, see Laumulin, above n. 10, 129-130. 
31  Uranium mines are located in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Burkhard Conrad, 
Regional (Non-) Proliferation: The Case of Central Asia, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 
April 2000, 2-3 <www.defac.ac.uk/colleges/csrc/document-listings/ca/K29>). 
32  Jack I. Garvey, A New Architecture for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, 12 Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2008), 344. 
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undertakes to maintain “effective standards of physical protection of nuclear material, 
facilities and equipment to prevent its unauthorized use or handling or theft”. The 
measures adopted to this aim must be “at least as effective” as those called for by the 
1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 33  and by the 
recommendations and guidelines developed by the IAEA in this field.34 Article 9 has 
been included as a measure to fight the increased risk of theft and the possibility to 
build nuclear arms from raw material.35 This is particularly important in the Central 
Asian region, where highly enriched uranium remains present at several sites and 
where the possibility of theft of nuclear-related materials is high.36 Central Asia might 
also become a transit area for terrorist smuggling of nuclear materials. 37  The 
Semipalatinsk Treaty could as well be seen as a step towards the implementation of 
Security Council Resolution 1540 of 28 April 2004, which requires all states to adopt 
effective laws which prohibit any non-state actors to manufacture, acquire, possess, 
develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their 
means of delivery and to establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate physical 
                                                          
33  The Convention, opened for signature on 3 March 1980 and entered into force 
on 8 February 1987, requires each contracting party “to take appropriate steps within the 
framework of its national law and consistent with international law to ensure as far as 
practicable that, during international nuclear transport, nuclear material within its territory, or 
on board a ship or aircraft under its jurisdiction insofar as such ship or aircraft is engaged in the 
transport to or from that State, is protected at the levels described in Annex 1” (Art. 3). The 
purpose, which is instrumental to Arts. I, II and III of the NPT, is to prevent fissile material, 
usable for the construction of arms from being illegally stolen. Unlike the other Central Asian 
states, Kyrgyzstan has yet not become a party of the Convention on Physical Protection 
(source: <http://ola.iaea.org/factSheets/CountryDetails.asp?country=KG>). 
34  The recommendations were prepared for the first time in 1972 by a panel of 
experts convened by the IAEA Director General and were revised in 1975, 1977, 1989, 1993 
and 1997. Even though they are not binding, the implementation of the IAEA 
recommendations is required by the agreements that the Agency concludes with the states to 
which it provides assistance and by the bilateral cooperation agreements in the field of nuclear 
energy. 
35  The only other treaty where this provision appears is the Pelindaba Treaty (Art. 
10). In Res. 1540 (2004), the UN Security Council expressed its concern for “the threat of illicit 
trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related 
materials, which adds a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also 
poses a threat to international peace and security”. 
36  It has indeed been suggested that “[t]he leading WMD-related risk in Central 
Asia is the possibility of the theft of materials and their sale by smugglers or through brokers to 
terrorist or proliferant states” (Togzhan Kassenova, Central Asia: Regional Security and WMD 
Proliferation Threats, Disarmament Forum (4) (2007), 13).  On the proliferation threats in 
Central Asia, see ibid., 15-17.  
37  Scott Parrish and William Potter, Central Asian States Establish Nuclear-
Weapon-Free-Zone Despite U.S. Opposition, CNS Research Story, 5 September 2006, at 
<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060905.htm>. For incidents of smuggling of radioactive 
material in the region, see Conrad, above n. 31, 3-4. 
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protection measures and effective domestic, border and export controls to prevent 
trafficking of weapons of mass destruction and related materials.38 
14. Certain obligations contained in other nuclear weapon-free zone treaties 
have not been included in the Semipalatinsk Treaty: the prohibition of armed attack 
on nuclear installations (Article 11 of the Pelindaba Treaty), the obligation to declare, 
dismantle, destroy or convert nuclear explosive devices and the facilities for their 
manufacture (Article 6 of the Pelindaba Treaty), the obligation to accede to the 
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Article 6 of the Bangkok 
Treaty). Furthermore, the Semipalatinsk Treaty does not expressly prohibit the use of 
nuclear explosive devices by the states parties. It could however be argued that such 
prohibition was considered implicit, as, after banning possession, control and any 
form of acquisition of such weapons, any use by the denuclearized states would be 
practically impossible. What Article 3 (1) (d) (i) of the Semipalatinsk Treaty does 
expressly say is that the contracting parties must not allow the use of nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices in their territory. This entails an obligation on the 
Central Asian states to prevent a nuclear weapon state from launching such devices 
from anywhere within their territory (for instance, from overflying aircraft) regardless 
of whether the target is located within or outside the nuclear weapon-free zone. 
 
III. The Environmental Provisions of the Semipalatinsk Treaty  
 
15. By establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone, the regional states aim not only to 
prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons and to promote disarmament, but also 
to protect the natural environment by prohibiting certain activities that might damage 
it.39 This ecological element, however, does not always have the same importance: if 
it plays a significant role in the Treaties of Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and 
Semipalatinsk, it is only of minor significance in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Indeed, the 
Cuban missile crisis and the risk of a nuclear war had left other problems in the 
background. 
16. The Semipalatinsk Treaty requires the states parties not to carry out any 
nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, to prohibit and prevent 
any such explosions at any place under their jurisdiction or control, and to refrain 
from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of any 
nuclear test explosion or any other nuclear explosion by other states (Article 5).40 The 
                                                          
38  Kazakhstan appears to have the most developed export control system in 
Central Asia and is also the only state to participate in the Nuclear Suppliers Group control 
regime (Kassenova, above n. 36, 19). 
39  According to the 1999 Report of the Disarmament Commission, “[n]uclear-
weapon-free zones may also serve to promote cooperation aimed at ensuring that the regions 
concerned remain free of environmental pollution from radioactive wastes and other 
radioactive substances and, as appropriate, enforcing internationally agreed standards regulating 
international transportation of those substances” (above n. 5, para. 17). 
40  See also Art. 1 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Art. 6 of the Rarotonga Treaty, Art. 
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prohibition of nuclear test explosions is usually conceived as a provision aimed to 
prevent nuclear proliferation by hampering the development of new types of weapons 
of mass destruction and the modernization of the existing ones. In the nuclear 
weapon-free zone treaties, however, this prohibition has mainly an environmental 
purpose. Indeed, these agreements are concluded by states that (with a few 
exceptions) have never had nuclear ambitions: the inclusion of the prohibition under 
examination mainly aims to prevent that the ecosystem of certain regions is damaged 
by nuclear explosions carried out by the nuclear powers.41 For instance, the South 
Pacific nuclear weapon-free zone was established mainly in order to prevent further 
nuclear tests by France in the region. As far as Central Asia is concerned, it is worth 
recalling that the Soviet Union conducted more than 450 atmospheric and 
underground nuclear tests in Semipalatinsk between 1949 and 1989.42 
17. The Semipalatinsk Treaty requires the states parties not to carry out and to 
prohibit any nuclear explosion, not only those above a certain threshold as provided 
in the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 
Treaty, concluded by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 
Furthermore, both underground and atmospheric explosions are prohibited: in that, 
the Semipalatinsk Treaty takes the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
(expressly referred to in Article 5)43 as a model and differs from the 1963 Partial Test 
Ban Treaty (PTBT), Article 1 (1) of which prohibits nuclear explosions in the 
atmosphere, in outer space and under water (including the territorial sea and the high 
sea) or in any other environment only “if such explosion causes radioactive debris to 
be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or 
control such explosion is conducted” and thus implicitly allows underground 
explosions if they do not cause the leakage of radioactivity.44 The prohibition of all 
nuclear test explosions solves the problems caused by the absence, in the PTBT, of a 
definition of “underground” explosions in order to distinguish them from the 
“atmospheric” ones and by the impossibility to establish in advance whether or not 
an underground nuclear test explosion will cause the release of radioactive material 
with transboundary effects. 
18. However, the provisions on testing included in the Semipalatinsk Treaty 
also contain some loopholes. While the other nuclear weapon-free zone treaties 
simply prohibit the “testing” of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, 
                                                                                                                                      
3 (1) (c) and 3 (2) (c) of the Bangkok Treaty and Art. 5 of the Pelindaba Treaty. 
41  As acknowledged in the guidelines adopted by the Disarmament Commission 
in 1999, the nuclear weapon-free zones are “a useful complement to the international regime 
for the prohibition of any nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion” 
(Report of the Disarmament Commission, above n. 5, para. 37) 
42  Abel J. González, Radioactive Residues of the Cold War Period: A Radiological 
Legacy, IAEA Bulletin, No. 40 (4) (December 1998), 4. 
43  All five Central Asian states have ratified the CTBT. 
44  The only other treaty that comprehensively prohibits all nuclear explosions, 
including underground ones, in its territorial scope of application is the 1959 Washington 
Treaty on Antarctica (Art. V (1)).  
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according to Article 5 of the Semipalatinsk Treaty the parties undertakes not to carry 
out or cause, encourage or in any way participate in any nuclear explosion. Hence, by 
prohibiting the carrying out of nuclear “explosions” and not simply of “tests”, the 
treaty leaves the door open to simulations. The reasons for this are not clear and it 
might well be an oversight. Furthermore, to be banned the test explosion must be 
“nuclear” and there must be some release of this type of energy: hydrodynamic 
experiments (where the fissile material of the weapon is replaced by other materials 
and there is no release of atomic energy) and sub-critical tests (where no self-
sustaining nuclear chain reaction can take place even though special nuclear material 
is present) are thus not prohibited.45 It is also to be noted that, as the definitions of 
“nuclear weapon” and “nuclear explosive device” contained in the treaties on nuclear 
weapon-free zones do not include the means of transport or delivery if separable 
from the weapons and not an indivisible part of them, missile tests are not prohibited. 
Finally, unlike the Treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba and like the Treaties of 
Tlatelolco and Bangkok, the Semipalatinsk Treaty is not accompanied by a protocol 
by the ratification of which the nuclear weapon states expressly accept not to carry 
out nuclear test explosions and to refrain from assisting and encouraging them within 
the zone.46 
19. Under Article 3 (2) of the Semipalatinsk Treaty, the parties also undertake 
not to allow the disposal in their territory of radioactive waste of other states. 
“Radioactive waste” is defined in Article 1 (e) as “any substance containing 
radionuclides, that will be or has already been removed and is no longer utilized, at 
activities and activity concentrations of radionuclides greater than the exemption 
levels established in international standards issued by the IAEA”. This prohibition is 
however not as broad as its counterpart in other nuclear weapon-free zone treaties, as 
it does not prohibit the disposal of a state party’s radioactive waste in its own 
territory: indeed, the parties are only required not to allow the disposal of radioactive 
waste of other states.47 It is not clear whether this is an intentional omission. 
                                                          
45  The United States carried out its sixth sub-critical test on 9 February 1999, 
maintaining its legality under the CTBT because it did not trigger a nuclear chain reaction 
(Ramesh Thakur, South Asia and the Politics of Non-Proliferation, 54 International Journal 
(1998-1999), 407). During the sixth NPT Review Conference, however, Switzerland argued that 
sub-critical and laboratory tests are not consistent with the preamble of the CTBT (Rebecca 
Johnson, The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise, 46 
Disarmament Diplomacy (May 2000), <http://www.acronym.org.uk/46npt.htm>). 
46  The reason for the inclusion of such a protocol in the Treaties of Rarotonga 
and Pelindaba is well-known: France carried out nuclear experiments in Algeria until 1963, 
while the South Pacific Ocean was the firing ground for the first atmospheric and then 
underground nuclear test explosions of United Kingdom, United States and France. 
47  See Art. 7 of the Rarotonga Treaty, Art. 7 of the Pelindaba Treaty, Art. 3 (3) of 
the Bangkok Treaty. There is no prohibition of dumping in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The 
Central Asian states have also ratified the 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, entered into force in 2001, 
which aims to ensure that there are effective defences against hazards related to the 
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20. Unlike the Bangkok Treaty (Article 6), the Semipalatinsk Treaty does not 
provide for the obligation of early notification of a nuclear accident. On the other 
hand, the Central Asian treaty contains a “green” provision not appearing in any 
other nuclear weapon-free zone treaty. According to Article 6, “[e]ach party 
undertakes to assist any efforts toward the environmental rehabilitation of territories 
contaminated as a result of past activities related to the development, production or 
storage of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in particular uranium 
tailings storage sites and nuclear test sites”. The provision refers to the areas 
contaminated as a result of the nuclear-related activities carried out in Central Asia 
during the Soviet era, such as weapons storage and testing, uranium mining, 
plutonium production.48 The obligation is however a mere obligation of conduct, not 
an obligation to achieve a precise result (the environmental rehabilitation of 
contaminated territories) and is presumably triggered by the request for assistance of 
the state to which the contaminated territories belong. The main problem for the 
implementation of this provision might be the lack of adequate financial and human 
resources to fulfil the task. 
 
21. From the above considerations, it should be evident that the Semipalatinsk 
Treaty, like the other nuclear weapon-free zone treaties, has a composite structure 
where both localized and non-localized obligations are present49: the prohibition of 
stationing nuclear explosive devices (whoever possesses or controls them) within the 
zone is a localized obligation, while the prohibitions of possession, control, use and 
manufacture, of military nuclear research, testing, to allow the disposal of radioactive 
waste, of export of fissile material without safeguards, and the obligations of physical 
protection of nuclear materials and equipment and to conclude a safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA are characterized more by a personal than by a territorial 
nature. This composite structure has consequences on state succession. The localized 
obligations are transmitted to the successor state(s) under Article 12 of the 1978 
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (or the customary 
norm of identical content).50 On the contrary, the clean slate rule applies to non-
                                                                                                                                      
management of such materials and to prevent accidents with radiological effects. The 
Convention applies to both radioactive waste management from civilian applications and to 
military spent fuel or radioactive waste if and when such materials are transferred permanently 
to and managed within exclusively civilian programmes. The Convention also establishes rules 
for the transboundary movement of spent fuel and radioactive waste. 
48  Kassenova, above n. 36, 13. The Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in Kazakhstan 
and the uranium tailings dump in Kyrgyzstan are the most well-known examples of areas in 
Central Asia contaminated as a result of the Soviet nuclear activities (Alibek Dzhekshenkulov, 
A Nuclear-Free Zone in Central Asia, 45 International Affairs (Moscow) (4) (1999), 54). 
49  O’Connell admits the existence of treaties, such as those establishing military 
bases, where personal and territorial elements are intermingled (Daniel Patrick O’Connell, 
Recent Problems of State Succession in Relation to New States, 130 Recueil des Cours (1970), 
194-195). 
50  According to the ICJ, Art. 12 of the Vienna Convention reflects customary 
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localized obligations.51 Accordingly, the state that acquires in whole or in part the 
territory of a denuclearized state will be able to possess, manufacture and use (if such 
use is consistent with other international law) nuclear explosive devices as long as 
they are not stationed in the territory formerly belonging to the denuclearized state. 
The same conclusion applies to states formed from the dismemberment of a 
denuclearized state and to those incorporating or resulting from the merger of two or 
more states, of which at least one was party to a nuclear weapon-free zone treaty. Of 
course, the new state exercising sovereignty over the denuclearized territory might 
decide to succeed also in the non-localized obligations, but it would be under no 
international obligation to do so. 
 
IV. The Territorial Extension of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone 
and the Rights of Entry into Ports and Overflight of Foreign Nuclear Ships, 
Aircraft and Missiles 
 
22. According to Article 1 (a) of the Semipalatinsk Treaty, the Central Asian nuclear 
weapon-free zone includes Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The treaty is thus not open: only after amending 
Article 1 could other states adhere to it. A provision envisaging the possible 
expansion of the zone to neighbouring states was eventually deleted at the insistence 
of United Kingdom, United States and France, which were worried that participation 
in a nuclear weapon-free zone might be used by Iran in order to shield its nuclear 
programme.52 
23. From a geographical point of view, the zone covers “the land territory, all 
waters (harbors, lakes, rivers and streams) and the air space above them, which belong” 
to the above mentioned five states (Article 2 (a)).53 It appears that, in the Sapporo 
meeting of October 1999, the Central Asian states agreed that the zone should not 
include any portions of the Caspian Sea, the waters of which have not been clearly 
delimited yet. 54  If interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the terms 
                                                                                                                                      
international law (Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia), ICJ Reports 1997, para. 
123). 
51  O’Connell maintains that “[t]he transmissible portions of a treaty may be 
severed from the intransmissible if the two portions (a) deal with separate subject-matters, (b) 
do not depend upon each other, and (c) are not inseparably connected in the scheme of treaty 
performance” (Daniel Patrick O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), Vol. II, at 301). The separability of the 
different provisions contained in the same treaty is also envisaged in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Art. 44). 
52  Luthra, above n. 22. In February 2008, the Presidents of Tajikistan and Iran 
issued a joint statement where they support the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones 
(Tajikistan, Iran Stand for a World Without Nuclear Arms, Kazinform, 13 February 2008, 
<http://www.inform.kz/showarticle.php?lang=eng&id=160537>). 
53  Emphasis added. 
54  Parrish, above n. 8, 144. Two littoral states - Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan - 
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employed, however, Article 2 (a) does not explicitly (and permanently) exclude the 
Caspian from the scope of application of the treaty. 55  Indeed, according to the 
prevalent view,56  the Caspian is not a “sea” but rather an international lake not 
governed by the law of the sea, and lakes are included in the list contained in Article 2 
(a). What presently prevents the Caspian’s inclusion in the zone is the fact that no 
agreement among the littoral states has been reached on the delimitation of its waters 
and thus no part of them uncontroversially “belongs” to Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan. Nonetheless, once such an agreement will be concluded and relevant 
portions of the Caspian waters will be determined to belong to the two Central Asian 
denuclearized states, those waters will constitute part of their territory and will 
consequently be included in the zone, in accordance with Article 2 (a) of the 
Semipalatinsk Treaty. This interpretation is supported by the inclusion of the 
precautionary clause contained in the second paragraph of Article 2, according to 
which “[n]othing in this Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights of any 
Central Asian States in any dispute concerning the ownership of or sovereignty over 
lands or waters that may or may not be included within this zone”. If read together, 
all the two paragraphs of Article 2 of the Semipalatinsk Treaty seem to say is that the 
extension of the application of the Semipalatinsk Treaty to any portion of the Caspian 
depends on the successful conclusion of the negotiations on the delimitation of its 
waters, matter which is left unaffected by the treaty. 
24. It follows from the above considerations and in particular from the 
qualification of the Caspian as a lake that the law of the sea problems related to the 
freedom of navigation of foreign ships carrying nuclear weapons through the 
territorial sea and exclusive economic zones of denuclearized states, emerged in 
connection with the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok, do 
not arise with regard to the Semipalatinsk Treaty.57  The only controversial issue 
would be the entry of foreign nuclear ships in the denuclearized states’ harbors and 
the overflight of the denuclearized states’ territories by aircraft with nuclear weapons 
on board. Article 4 provides that “[w]ithout prejudice to the purposes and objectives 
of this treaty, each Party, in the exercise of its sovereign rights, is free to resolve 
issues related to transit through its territory by air, land or water, including visits by 
foreign ships to its ports and landing of foreign aircraft at its airfields”. 58  This 
                                                                                                                                      
are parties to the Semipalatinsk Treaty. 
55  The issue is not without importance, as the Russian Federation (a nuclear 
weapon state) is also a littoral state. 
56  William E. Butler, The Soviet Union and the Continental Shelf, 63 AJIL (1969), 
106; Robin R. Churchill and Alan V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1999), 60; Gilbert Gidel, Le droit international public de la mer (Chateauroux: 
Mellotté, 1932), Vol. 1, at 40; Mariangela Gramola, State Succession and the Delimitation of the 
Caspian Sea, 14 Italian Yearbook of International Law (2005), 237-238; Paul Tavernier, Le 
statut juridique de la mer Caspienne: mer ou lac?, Actualité et droit international, 20 October 
1999, <http://www.ridi.org/adi/199910a1.htm>. 
57  See Roscini, above n. 5, 145-256. 
58  Compare this provision with Art. 5 (2) of the Rarotonga Treaty, Art. 7 of the 
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provision introduces an exception to the obligation contained in Article 3 (1) (d), i.e. 
the obligation not to allow on the state party’s territory the possession of or control 
over any nuclear explosive device by anyone. But are the denuclearized states really 
“free” under international law to allow or deny the visit of nuclear ships and the 
overflight and landing of aircraft with nuclear weapons on board? 
25. It is generally accepted that, under customary international law, there is no 
obligation on the coastal state to accept foreign ships in its ports: the entry can thus 
be prohibited.59 According to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), it is “by virtue 
of its sovereignty that the coastal State may regulate access to its ports”60: as these 
waters have a status identical to that of the land territory as far as the exercise of 
sovereignty is concerned, there is no obligation to allow access to the ports. Hence, 
several states’ legislations provide that the relevant national authorities can in certain 
cases deny the authorization to the entry in the ports of nuclear propelled and nuclear 
armed ships.61 The denuclearized states could of course decide to authorize the entry, 
but only if this does not prejudice the purposes and objectives of the Semipalatinsk 
Treaty, as required by Article 4. 
26. Customary law, though, admits the entry of ships in the ports and internal 
waters of a foreign state even without previous authorization in one case, i.e. when 
the ship is in a situation of force majeure or distress.62 The former has been defined 
in Article 23 of the 2001 International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State 
Responsibility as “an irresistible force or […] an unforeseen event, beyond the 
control of the State, making it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform 
the obligation”, while the latter materializes when “the author of the act in question 
has no other reasonable way, in a situation of distress, of saving the author’s life or 
the lives of other persons entrusted to the author’s care” (Article 24).63 Modern 
                                                                                                                                      
Bangkok Treaty and Art. 4 (2) of the Pelindaba Treaty. 
59  See Giuseppe Cataldi, Il passaggio delle navi straniere nel mare territoriale 
(Milano: Giuffrè, 1990), 86; Louise de La Fayette, Access to Ports in International Law, 11 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (1996), 1-2; Rainer Lagoni, Internal Waters, 
Seagoing Vessels in, in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 
II (1999), 1036-1037. It has been noted that “[i]t is at times indeed difficult to make distinction 
between a simple anchorage of ships and landing of aircraft and their stationing prohibited by 
the provisions of these Treaties” (Djamchid Momtaz, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in Africa 
and Asia, in Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, Essays on International Law. 
Fortieth Anniversary Commemorative Volume (1997), 198). Although the language of Art. 4 
remains vague and does not specify what distinguishes transit from stationing, it appears that 
any temporary presence, to qualify as transit, would be restricted to a very short period of time 
only (Conrad, above n. 31, 5). 
60  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, para. 213. 
61  Roscini, above n. 5, 197-201. 
62  See Lagoni, above n. 59, 1040; Daniel Patrick O’Connell, The International 
Law of the Sea (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), Vol. II, at 853-857. 
63  The mentioned grounds cannot be invoked to exclude wrongfulness if the state 
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shipping treaties usually contain a clause providing for the exception of force 
majeure. 64  In spite of its strictness, even the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, 
Disarmament and Arms Control Act does not limit “the freedom of […] [a]ny ship or 
aircraft in distress”.65 According to the Group entrusted with drafting the text of the 
Rarotonga Treaty, the presence of a ship with nuclear weapons run aground within 
the nuclear weapon-free zone does not entail the violation of the treaty by the state 
party to which those waters belong, if it promptly adopts all necessary measures to 
remove the arms from its territory.66 However, according to other authors, nuclear 
ships can be denied entry into the ports and internal waters even in the above 
mentioned exceptional circumstances because of “an actual risk of criticality, 
radiation or radioactive contamination of the population of the coastal State, of the 
installations of the port and of the environment”.67 This view seems to be confirmed 
by Article 24 of the ILC Articles, that rules out the possibility to invoke distress as a 
circumstance excluding wrongfulness if “the act in question is likely to create a 
comparable or greater peril” (the commentary to this provision makes the example of 
a nuclear submarine with a serious breakdown that might cause the radioactive 
contamination of the port in which it seeks refuge),68 and by the declaration issued by 
the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade with regard to the passage of 
the Japanese ship Akatsuki Maru (“[p]ort access is normally granted to ships in 
distress but safety would be a paramount consideration in deciding whether to grant 
access to the plutonium ship”).69  
27. As to the overflight of the territory of a state party to the Semipalatinsk 
Treaty by foreign aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, according to Article 3 (c) of the 
1944 Chicago Convention (to which all five Central Asian states are parties) state 
aircraft, including military ones, cannot overfly the territory of another state without 
its authorization, while Article 35 (a) provides that “[n]o munitions of war or 
implements of war may be carried in or above the territory of a State in aircraft 
engaged in international navigation, except by permission of such State”. States can 
                                                                                                                                      
invoking them has provoked, alone or in combination with other factors, the situation of force 
majeure or distress. 
64  O’Connell, above n. 62, 857. See also Art. 4 of the 1974 International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). 
65  Section 12, at <http://canterbury.cyberplace.org.nz/peace/nukefree.html>. 
66  Hisakazu Fujita, The Changing Role of International Law in the Nuclear Age: 
From Freedom of the High Seas to Nuclear-Free Zones, in Astrid J.M. Delissen and Gerard 
Jacob Tanja (eds.), Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict – Challenges Ahead. Essays in 
Honour of Frits Kalshoven (Dordrecht-Boston-London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), 
346. 
67  Werner Bischof, Nuclear ships, in Bernhardt (ed.), above n. 59, Vol. III (1997), 
722. See also Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, Ships in distress, ibid., Vol. IV (2000), 399. 
68  Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third 
session (23 April – 1 June and 2 July – 10 August 2001), UN Doc. A/56/10, GAOR, fifty-sixth 
session, Suppl. No. 10, 194. 
69  14 Australian YIL (1993), 445. 
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thus submit to authorization the overflight of their territory and the landing of 
foreign aircraft, determining the conditions for its granting, among which there could 
be the absence on board of nuclear arms and materials. State practice confirms this 
view. The United States granted the authorization of overflight to a French air tanker 
flying from France to Tahiti only after the French authorities had assured that the 
cargo “did not include nuclear material or components but rather consisted of naval 
stores”.70 New Zealand does not allow aircraft with nuclear arms on board to overfly 
its territory,71 while in 1979 Australia signed an agreement with the United States 
authorizing the overflight of B-52 and their call in Darwin: the US government, 
however, agreed not to provide them with nuclear weapons.72 Spain has also adopted 
restrictive legislation in this field.73 
28. A nuclear warhead can be carried not only by a ship or aircraft, but also by 
a missile. Two cases must be distinguished, depending on whether the missile passes 
through the air space only or also through the outer space in order to reach its 
target.74 In the former case, the states parties to the Semipalatinsk Treaty are under an 
obligation to deny permission to the overflight by the nuclear missile, as Article 3 (1) 
(d) (i) requires them not to allow the use of nuclear explosive devices in their 
territories.75 The exception with regard to transit contained in Article 4 does not 
operate as far as missiles with a nuclear warhead are concerned: while the aircraft or 
ship could simply transport a nuclear explosive device from a location to another, a 
launched missile necessarily aims to hit a target and must thus be qualified as “use”, 
                                                          
70  Abram Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich and Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International 
Legal Process: Materials for an Introductory Course (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1968), 1052.  
71  New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act, above 
n.  65, Section 10. 
72  Australian Foreign Affairs Record, March 1985, 235-236; ibid., September 
1985, 863-864. 
73  See Art. 70 of Law No. 25 of 29 April 1964 (United Nations Legislative Series 
– National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea (ST/LEG.SER.B/16), 1974, 
at 46). In an exchange of notes with the United States, the Spanish government reaffirmed the 
prohibition to overfly the national territory by aircraft with nuclear material or weapons on 
board (Javier Díez Hochleitner, Régimen de navegación de los buques de guerra extranjeros por 
el mar territorial español y de sus escalas en puertos españoles, 38 Revista española de derecho 
internacional (1986), 567). 
74  On the controversial border between air space and outer space, see Daniel 
Goedhuis, The Problems of the Frontiers of Outer Space and Air Space, 174 Recueil des Cours 
(1982), 391-402. 
75  Ronzitti reaches this conclusion through a different reasoning and in relation 
to the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Bangkok only (Natalino Ronzitti, Missile Warfare and Nuclear 
Warheads - An Appraisal in the Light of the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 27 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1997), 255). 
However, there is no reason why the same conclusion should not apply to the Treaties of 
Rarotonga and Pelindaba too: as argued above, the exception clause with regard to transit is not 
applicable to nuclear missiles. 
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and not “transit”, of nuclear weapons. 
29. On the contrary, if the missile, in its trajectory, passes through the outer 
space above a denuclearized state, this will not be entitled to deny the passage: 
indeed, the outer space is not subject to national appropriation and is free for 
exploration and use by all states. It would not be possible to invoke the 1967 Outer 
Space Treaty, Article IV (1) of which merely prohibits to place in orbit around the 
Earth or station objects carrying weapons of mass destruction, and does not deal with 
those flying through outer space in order to reach a target on Earth: it is necessary for 
the carrier to be prohibited that it completes at least one orbit around the Earth.76 
The destination exclusively for peaceful purposes provided in para. 2 of Article IV is 
also not relevant here, as its scope of application is the moon and other celestial 
bodies and not the outer space in general. What is more, with its inclusion the 
drafters of the 1967 treaty did not aim to prohibit all military activities, but only those 
in contrast with the provisions of the UN Charter on the use of armed force.77 
 
V. Grounds for Terminating the Obligations Arising from the Semipalatinsk 
Treaty 
 
30. The right of the contracting parties to terminate their obligations under the 
Semipalatinsk Treaty can be founded on two legal bases: the general grounds for the 
termination and suspension of the operation of treaties, codified in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the withdrawal clause included in the final 
text of the treaty itself. 78  As to the former, Articles 60 and 62 of the Vienna 
Convention appear to be of particular importance for disarmament treaties, including 
those on nuclear weapon-free zones. Article 60 (2) (a) states that, unless otherwise 
provided,79 a material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the 
                                                          
76  See Luigi Condorelli and Zidane Mériboute, Some Remarks on the State of 
International Law Concerning Military Activities in Outer Space, 6 Italian YIL (1985), 9, 20-25.  
77  On Art. IV of the Outer Space Treaty, see Sergio Marchisio, Le basi militari nel 
diritto internazionale (Milano: Giuffrè, 1984), 303-304. 
78  A ground for terminating or suspending the Semipalatinsk Treaty neither 
provided in the treaty itself nor codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is 
the outbreak of hostilities between parties. The matter is governed by customary international 
law, but it is unclear what this provides. Aust argues that the inclusion of “political” treaties 
among those that might be terminated by the outbreak of hostilities (suggested by Lord McNair 
over forty years ago) “needs to be re-examined in the light of changes during recent decades, in 
particular the conclusion of multilateral treaties on disarmament, arms control and 
demilitarisation” (Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 309). In 2004, the ILC decided to include the topic in its programme of 
work and appointed Ian Brownlie as Special Rapporteur. On the application of the nuclear 
weapon-free zone treaties in time of armed conflict, see Roscini, above n. 5, 109-116. 
79  Art. 60 (4). For instance, Art. XII (2) of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
provides that “[i]n cases where a State Party has been requested by the Executive Council to 
take measures to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance, and where 
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other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the treaty in whole 
or in part or to terminate it in the relations between themselves and the defaulting 
State, or as between all the parties.80 Furthermore, the party specially affected by the 
breach (e.g., the state whose territory has been reached by the radioactive pollution 
caused by the material breach) can invoke it as a ground for suspending the operation 
of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting State 
(Article 60 (2) (b)). 
31. If the treaty is “of such a character that a material breach of its provisions 
by one party radically changes the position of every party with respect to the further 
performance of its obligations under the treaty”, any party other than the defaulting 
State can invoke the breach as a ground for suspending (but not terminating) the 
operation of the treaty in whole or in part with respect to itself (Article 60 (2) (c)).81 
The main obligations contained in the Semipalatinsk Treaty fall within the scope of 
this paragraph. Indeed, the prohibitions to station, possess, control, test, manufacture, 
stockpile, to conduct research on nuclear explosive devices and to seek or receive 
assistance to these aims can be qualified as “integral” obligations, as they operate “in 
an all-or-nothing fashion”82: even though they pursue a collective interest of the 
group, “each parties’ performance is effectively conditioned upon and requires the 
performance of the other”.83 As Gerald Fitzmaurice puts it, “the obligation of each 
                                                                                                                                      
the State Party fails to fulfil the request within the specified time, the Conference may, inter alia, 
upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, restrict or suspend the State Party’s rights 
and privileges under this Convention until it undertakes the necessary action to conform with 
its obligations under this Convention”. A similar provision is contained also in Art. V (2) of the 
CTBT. 
80  In its Advisory Opinion on the legal consequences for states of the continued 
presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 
the ICJ has held that Art. 60 is “in many respects” a codification of existing customary 
international law (ICJ Reports 1971, para. 94). This view was more recently reasserted in the 
judgment on the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case (above n. 50, para. 46). 
81  Art. 60 (2) (c) is echoed in Art. 42 (b) (ii) of the 2001 ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility. As the Special Rapporteur Crawford has noted, the category of integral 
obligations “has as much relevance for State responsibility as it has for treaty suspension. The 
other parties to an integral obligation which has been breached may have no interest in its 
suspension and should be able to insist, vis-à-vis the responsible State, on cessation and 
restitution” (James Crawford, Fourth Report on State Responsibility, A/CN.4/517, 2 April 
2001, 15). 
82  Ibid. 
83  Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third 
session, above n. 68, 299. The Commission includes disarmament and nuclear free zone treaties 
among the examples of this type of obligations. See also the Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its eighteenth session (4 May – 19 July 1966), UN Doc. 
A/6309/Rev.1, GAOR, twenty-first session, Suppl. No. 9, at 255. In legal literature, see Aust, 
above n. 78, 294-295; K. Sachariew, State Responsibility for Multilateral Treaty Violations: 
Identifying the Injured State and Its Legal Status, 35 Netherlands ILR (1988), 281, who makes 
the example of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Paul Reuter has also supported the 
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party to disarm, or not to exceed a certain level of armaments, or not to manufacture 
or possess certain types of weapons, is necessarily dependent on a corresponding 
performance of the same thing by all the other parties, since it is the essence of such a 
treaty that the undertaking of each party is given in return for a similar undertaking by 
the others”.84 
32. Nonetheless, the Semipalatinsk Treaty also contains obligations of a 
different nature. The prohibitions to allow the disposal of radioactive waste and to 
provide fissionable material to non-nuclear weapon states without IAEA safeguards 
and the obligations of physical protection of nuclear material and equipment and of 
assistance in the environmental rehabilitation of contaminated territories are assumed 
erga omnes partes: like integral obligations, they are expression of a collective interest 
and are not assumed towards one or more specific parties, but towards the group as a 
whole.85 All parties “are recognized as having a common interest, over and above any 
individual interest that may exist in a given case”.86 However, these obligations differ 
from integral ones in that, their performance by one member of the group is not 
dependent on a corresponding performance by the others.87 These obligations are 
thus covered not by para. 2 (c) of Article 60 of the Vienna Convention, but by paras. 
2 (a) and (b).88 
33. Whatever the nature of the breached provision, Article 60 only applies to a 
“material breach”: would the acquisition or production of nuclear explosive devices 
or their stationing within the nuclear weapon-free zone be a “material breach” of the 
Semipalatinsk Treaty? An affirmative answer appears preferable, if one considers that 
a “material breach” is a “violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of 
the object or purpose of the treaty”, and that the object and purpose of the 
Semipalatinsk Treaty is to ensure the total absence of nuclear explosive devices from 
Central Asia with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons globally.89  
                                                                                                                                      
application of Art. 60 (2) (c) to disarmament treaties (Introduction to the Law of Treaties 
(London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1995), 38), while Lysén suggests that the 
application of para. 2 (a) of Art. 60 would be preferable (Göran Lysén, The Adequacy of the 
Law of the Treaties to Arms Control Agreements, in Julie Dahlitz (ed.), Avoidance and 
Settlement of Arms Control Disputes (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1994), 141). 
84  Gerald Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, A/CN.4/107, 15 
March 1957, 54. 
85  Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third 
session, above n. 68, 320-321. 
86  James Crawford, Third Report on State Responsibility, A/CN.4/507, 15 March 
2000, 41. 
87  Therefore, integral obligations can be considered a sub-category of obligations 
erga omnes partes (Crawford, above n. 86, 47). 
88  A nuclear weapon-free zone treaty might also contain obligations of a mainly 
bilateral character, assumed towards one or more specific parties: an example is the prohibition 
of armed attack on nuclear installations situated within the zone contained in Art. 11 of the 
Pelindaba Treaty. 
89  See preamble of the Semipalatinsk Treaty. See also D.N. Hutchinson, Solidarity 
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34. A fundamental change of circumstances could also be invoked by the 
parties in order to terminate or suspend their participation in the Semipalatinsk 
Treaty. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention, which is generally thought to reflect 
customary international law,90 requires some cumulative conditions for this ground to 
be invoked: the circumstances must have existed at the time of the conclusion of the 
treaty and must have constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be 
bound by the treaty; and the change must be fundamental, “completely” unforeseen 
and having the effect of radically transforming the extent of obligations still to be 
performed under the treaty91 As acknowledged by the ICJ in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros 
case, though, “[t]he negative and conditional wording of Article 62 […] is a clear 
indication […] that the stability of the treaty relations requires that the plea of 
fundamental change of circumstances be applied only in exceptional cases”,92 which 
might at least partly explain why “the doctrine of fundamental change has extremely 
rarely been invoked successfully before international judicial bodies”.93 In any case, all 
five states parties to the Semipalatinsk Treaty have acceded to the 1969 Vienna 
Convention and are thus required to comply with the procedure spelt out in Articles 
65-68 when invoking a ground for termination or suspension provided therein.94 
35. A further (and easier to invoke) means at the disposal of the parties in 
order to terminate their obligations under the Semipalatinsk Treaty is expressly 
provided by the treaty itself. Like all disarmament agreements, the nuclear weapon-
free zone treaties contain very broad withdrawal clauses.95 The inclusion of such 
clauses in disarmament treaties has been the object of discussion. According to Sims, 
“[t]he logic of withdrawal clauses implies at least a partial reversibility of the treaties in 
which they are incorporated. Now, it is by no means generally agreed that a 
                                                                                                                                      
and Breaches of Multilateral Treaties, 59 BYBIL (1989), 196.  
90  Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland), Jurisdiction, Judgment of 2 
February 1973, ICJ Reports 1973, para. 36. 
91  Implicit reference to the rebus sic stantibus doctrine appears to have been 
made by the United States ad abundantiam when denouncing the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty (read the US declaration at 
<http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0112/doc01.htm#text>). See Rein Müllerson, The ABM 
Treaty: Changed Circumstances, Extraordinary Events, Supreme Interests and International 
Law, 50 ICLQ (2001), 539); and the opposite view suggested by Malgosia Fitzmaurice and 
Olufemi Elias, Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties (Utrecht: Eleven Publishing, 2005), 
195. 
92  Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, above n. 50, para. 104. 
93  Fitzmaurice and Elias, above n. 91, 188-189. 
94  On whether or not these procedural requirements reflect customary 
international law, see Fitzmaurice and Elias, above n. 91, 195-198. 
95  Art. 54 (a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that the 
withdrawal of a party may take place in conformity with the provisions of the treaty itself. It is 
debatable whether the withdrawal clause allows not only the termination of the treaty but also 
its suspension (Duncan B. Hollis, Russia Suspends CFE Treaty Participation, ASIL Insight, 23 
July 2007, at <http://asil.org/insights/2007/07/insights070723.html>). 
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disarmament treaty should be reversible”.96 On the contrary, Cannizzaro doubts that 
nuclear non-proliferation treaties such as the NPT are irreversible.97 The (scarce) 
practice seems to support the latter view. None of the Security Council resolutions 
concerning the North Korean withdrawal from the NPT qualifies such withdrawal as 
illegal, but on the contrary they try to persuade the Asian state with different degrees 
of pressure to retract its announcement and return to the NPT.98 In the 1993 debates 
in the Security Council, the North Korean representative affirmed that “[t]he 
withdrawal of our country from the NPT was based on our full right under the 
Treaty, a right that belongs to every sovereign Member State”99 and even the South 
Korean representative noted that “every party has the right to withdraw from the 
Treaty”.100 The British representative also did not question “the right of States to 
withdraw from treaties if such withdrawal is in accordance with the provisions of the 
treaty concerned”.101 The very fact that the three depositaries of the NPT issued a 
joint statement questioning the existence of the “extraordinary events” relating to the 
subject matter of the treaty claimed by North Korea in 1993 seems to suggest that the 
withdrawal would have been lawful had that requirement been met.102 Russia did not 
challenge the legality of the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in December 
2001,103 and no state (not even the other parties) seems to have labelled as illegal 
Russia’s statement on the suspension of its obligations under the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and related agreements in July 2007.104 
36. Be that as it may, the fact remains that a withdrawal clause has been 
                                                          
96  Nicholas A. Sims, Approaches to Disarmament: An Introductory Analysis 
(London: Quaker Peace and Service, 1979), 51-52. 
97  Enzo Cannizzaro, Recesso dal Trattato sulla non proliferazione nucleare e 
minaccia alla pace, 89 Rivista di diritto internazionale (2006), 1081-1082. 
98  See SC Resolutions 825 of 11 May 1993, 1695 of 15 July 2006 and 1718 of 15 
October 2006. 
99  S/PV.3212, 11 May 1993, 7. 
100  Ibid., at 30. 
101  Ibid., at 54. 
102  S/25515, 2 April 1993, reprinted in SCOR, Forty-eighth year, Supplement for 
April, May and June 1993, at 15. 
103  On the contrary, President Putin recognized that “[t]he Treaty does indeed 
allow each of the parties to withdraw from it under exceptional circumstances”, although it 
qualified the US decision as a mistake 
(<http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0112/doc01.htm#text>). 
104  Hollis, above n. 95. NATO states declared themselves “disappointed” and 
“deeply concerned” by Russia’s decision but did not challenge its legality (NATO Response to 
Russian Announcement of Intent to Suspend Obligations under the CFE Treaty, NATO Press 
Release 2007(085), 16 July 2007, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2007/p07-085e.html>). See 
also the US Department of State’s spokesman’s declaration, Russian Announcement of 
Intention to Suspend Implementation of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, Press 
Statement 2007/588, 14 July 2007, at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/88417.htm>. 
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included in the final text of the Semipalatinsk Treaty. 105  In the Rarotonga and 
Bangkok Treaties, the right of withdrawal is triggered by the breach by another party 
of a provision essential to the achievement of the objectives of the treaty.106 Taking 
the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Pelindaba as a model, Article 16 of the Semipalatinsk 
Treaty provides that “[a]ny Party may, by written notification addressed to the 
Depositary, withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related 
to the subject-matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized its supreme national 
interests”.107 The withdrawal takes effect twelve months after the date of receipt of 
                                                          
105  As to the relationship between an express right of withdrawal included in the 
treaty and the general grounds for termination, in particular the fundamental change of 
circumstances, it has been suggested that “the relations between the parties should be governed 
first and foremost by what they have expressly agreed” (Fitzmaurice and Elias, above n. 91, 
193). Müllerson, on the other hand, argues that “[e]xpress provisions providing for the 
possibility of the denunciation of a treaty do not exclude the use of another concept available 
for treaty termination” (above n. 91, 530). Similarly, see Paolo Fois, Il consenso ad obbligarsi 
nel Trattato sulla non-proliferazione nucleare, 91 Rivista di diritto internazionale (2008), 50. It 
has also been noted that the concept of “material breach” under Art. 60 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention applies to “a more limited number of situations than that covered by the 
extraordinary circumstances clause”, as “the latter might also refer to events which do not 
involve the responsibility of the other party”  (Natalino Ronzitti, Problems of Arms Control 
Treaty Interpretation, in Julie Dahlitz and Detlev Dicke (eds.), The International Law of Arms 
Control and Disarmament, Proceedings of the Symposium, Geneva 28 February-2 March 1991 
(New York: United Nations, 1991), 121). The same writer also notes that the extraordinary 
circumstances clause allows withdrawal from a disarmament treaty in a number of 
circumstances greater than the rebus sic stantibus doctrine, even though only the operation of 
the former is conditioned upon giving notice of the intention to withdraw to the other parties 
(ibid.). The opposite argument is made by Müllerson, who maintains that recourse to a 
withdrawal clause based on “extraordinary events” and “supreme interests” requires much 
more concrete threats than the fundamental but broad circumstances required by the rebus sic 
stantibus doctrine (Müllerson, above n. 91, 531). 
106  Arts. 13 and 22, respectively. The clause contained in the Rarotonga Treaty 
provides that the right of withdrawal can be exercised also in the case of a violation of the 
“spirit” of the treaty, which is of difficult interpretation (David A.C. Freestone and J. Scott 
Davidson, Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones, in Istvan Pogany (ed.), Nuclear Weapons and 
International Law (Aldershot-Brookfield-Hong Kong-Singapore-Sydney: Avebury, 1987), 201). 
It is worth noting that the withdrawal clause contained in the three additional protocols to the 
Rarotonga Treaty is modelled on that contained in the Treaty of Tlatelolco and allows 
withdrawal if the party decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the 
protocols have jeopardized its supreme interests. The withdrawal takes effect three months (not 
twelve, as in the main treaty) after the notification to the Depositary. The same goes for the 
additional protocol to the Bangkok Treaty, but this provides for a period of twelve months. 
107  Art. 20 of the Pelindaba Treaty is almost identical to Art. 16 of the 
Semipalatinsk Treaty, while Art. 31 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, although very similar, is broader, 
as it refers to “circumstances” (and not to “extraordinary events”), which may affect not only 
the supreme interests of the denouncing party but also “the peace and security of one or more 
Contracting Parties”. 
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the notification by the Depositary, during which the party must still observe the 
procedures to review compliance. 108  The lapse of time is aimed to permit 
consultations and negotiations in order to avoid the withdrawal. Non-compliance 
with the twelve month term, however, does not necessarily render the withdrawal 
unlawful: the withdrawal will become effective only after the twelve month period, in 
spite of the intention of the party to withdraw with immediate effect.109  
37. The Semipalatinsk Treaty does not set up any mechanism to review the 
party’s decision to withdraw, but requires that the notification of the withdrawal 
include a statement indicating the “extraordinary events” jeopardizing the party’s 
supreme national interests. Even though the other parties could question the 
existence of such extraordinary events,110 the lack of any definition and the vagueness 
of this concept hardly make it an effective deterrent against to the frivolous exercise 
of the right of withdrawal.111 However, a role might be played by the ICJ (should its 
                                                          
108  See, with regard to the NPT, Susan Carmody, Balancing Collective Security and 
National Sovereignty: Does the United Nations have the Right to Inspect North Korea’s 
Nuclear Facilities?, 18 Fordham ILJ (1994-1995), 283-284. The Treaty of Tlatelolco provides 
for an obligation to notify the intention to withdraw to the OPANAL’s General Secretary, the 
Rarotonga Treaty to the Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation, the 
Pelindaba Treaty to the Depositary (i.e., the African Union’s Secretary-General) and the 
Bangkok Treaty to the members of the Commission for the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon-
Free Zone. The Latin-American treaty also provides that the withdrawal shall be communicated 
to the other contracting parties and to the UN Secretary-General, Security Council and General 
Assembly as well as to the OAS Secretary-General. 
109  This situation materialized in January 2003, when North Korea announced its 
intention to withdraw with immediate effect from the NPT, even though this provides that the 
withdrawal takes effect three months after the notification to the other parties and to the UN 
Security Council (Art. X). This was justified by North Korea on the basis of its 1993 
announcement to withdraw from the NPT, subsequently suspended. See Cannizzaro, above n. 
97, 1080. 
110  The fact that every state party can “decide” when extraordinary events have 
jeopardized its supreme national interests does not mean that such decision cannot be 
scrutinized by the other parties. Otherwise, the circulation of the notification of withdrawal by 
the Depositary to all the other parties would make little sense (Art. 16 (b)). 
111  It is not easy to understand what is meant by “extraordinary events”. Examples 
might be new developments in the field of nuclear military technology or the entry into force of 
a particularly important amendment (Egon Schwelb, The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and 
International Law, 58 AJIL (1964), 663). According to Gounelle, as disarmament treaties are 
based on the balance of forces existing at the moment of negotiations, “[t]out élément qui 
viendrait troubler cet équilibre accepté est considéré comme un ‘événement extraordinaire en 
relation avec l’objet du traité’” (Max Gounelle, La motivation des actes juridiques en droit 
international public (Paris: Pedone, 1979), 155). Also the breach of the treaty or the withdrawal 
exercised by another party have been qualified as “extraordinary events” justifying the 
withdrawal (Jozef Goldblat and Péricles Gasparini Alves, Responses to Violations of Arms 
Control Agreements, in Serge Sur (ed.), Disarmament and Arms Limitation Obligations, 
Problems of Compliance and Enforcement (Aldershot et al.: Dartmouth; Geneva: UNIDIR, 
1994), 284; Fernando Mariño Menéndez, Zonas libres de armas nucleares en el derecho 
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jurisdiction be established over the case), since a controversy among states parties on 
whether a certain situation amounts to an “extraordinary event” according to Article 
16 of the Semipalatinsk Treaty would be a legal dispute concerning the interpretation 
of a treaty under Article 26 (2) (a) of the ICJ Statute. Furthermore, as suggested by 
Shaker in relation to the NPT, “an act of withdrawal by a Party in order to acquire 
nuclear weapons could be considered a ‘situation which might lead to international 
friction’ justifying an investigation by the Security Council under Article 34 of the UN 
Charter” and could even be characterised “as a ‘threat to the peace’ under Article 39, 
justifying the application of appropriate sanctions under Articles 40, 41 and 42”.112 Of 
course, not every withdrawal would automatically amount to a threat to the peace. 
Such a conclusion could only be reached by the Council on a case by case basis, taken 
the existing circumstances into account. 
                                                                                                                                      
internacional, in Cursos de derecho internacional de Vitoria-Gasteiz 1983 (1985), 162). Lysén 
argues that “extraordinary events” would be a breach of the treaty, the supervening 
impossibility of performance, the fundamental change of circumstances and the outbreak of 
war or armed conflict. To be “extraordinary”, the event should also “either be unforeseeable or, 
though foreseeable, thought by the parties as highly unlikely to occur” (Göran Lysén, The 
International Regulation of Armaments: The Law of Disarmament (Uppsala: Iustus, 1990), 
176-177). Announcing its intention to withdraw from the NPT on 10 January 2003, North 
Korea qualified the US hostile policy against North Korea as “extraordinary events” 
jeopardizing North Korean security (Raven Winters, Preventing Repeat Offenders: North 
Korea’s Withdrawal and the Need for Revisions to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 38 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2005), 1513). In order to justify its withdrawal from 
the ABM Treaty, the United States seems to have qualified the September 11th events and the 
possible missile attacks with weapons of mass destruction and without warning against the 
United States by terrorists or “rogue states” as extraordinary events related to the subject 
matter of the treaty and jeopardizing US security (13 December 2001) 
(<http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0112/doc01.htm#text>). Russia also listed the 
“exceptional circumstances affecting the security of the Russian Federation” and justifying the 
decision to suspend its participation in the CFE Treaty. The list includes the failure of Eastern 
European countries to make the necessary changes to the treaty regime in order to take their 
NATO membership into account; the increased number of NATO states and the “exclusive 
group” character of the alliance; the US plan to deploy conventional forces in Bulgaria and 
Romania; the failure to early ratify the Adaptation Agreement and to comply with the Istanbul 
Agreements by certain CFE parties; and the non-participation of the Baltic states in the CFE 
Treaty (Information on the decree “On Suspending the Russian Federation’s Participation in 
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Related International Agreements”, 
14 July 2007, at <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2007-161-32.cfm>). In the context of 
the NPT, Germany proposed the conclusion of an agreement clarifying, among other things, 
what constitutes an “extraordinary event” (Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review 
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
Working Paper No. 15, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.15, 29 April 2004, at 
<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/papers/GermanyWP15.pdf>, 2). 
112  Mohamed I. Shaker, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Origin and 
Implementation, 1959-1979 (London-Rome-New York: Oceana Publications, 1980), Vol. II, 
896. See also Fois, above n. 105, 57-58. 
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VI. The Negative Security Assurances by the Nuclear Weapon States 
 
38. Para. II of the above mentioned Resolution 3472 (XXX) B of 11 December 1975, 
containing the General Assembly’s definition of “nuclear weapon-free zone”, 
provides that the nuclear weapon states must “undertake or reaffirm, in a solemn 
international instrument having full legally binding force, such as a treaty, a 
convention or a protocol, the following obligations: (a) To respect in all its parts the 
statute of total absence of nuclear weapons defined in the treaty or convention which 
serves as the constitutive instrument of the zone; (b) To refrain from contributing in 
any way to the performance in the territories forming part of the zone of acts which 
involve a violation of the aforesaid treaty or convention; (c) To refrain from using or 
threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States included in the zone”.113 When 
drafting the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the participating states discussed how such 
commitments should be formalized. Certain states were in favour of a General 
Assembly resolution approving the establishment of the zone and bounding all states 
that had endorsed it with their vote. Others preferred a protocol attached to the main 
treaty, containing the obligations of the nuclear weapon powers towards the 
denuclearized states.114 The latter view eventually prevailed and was also adopted by 
the drafters of the Treaties of Rarotonga, Pelindaba, Bangkok and Semipalatinsk: it 
can now be maintained that an additional protocol containing (negative) security 
assurances is an essential component of the model treaty for the establishment of 
nuclear weapon-free zones in inhabited regions of the world.115 In its 1996 Advisory 
                                                          
113  See also para. 62 of the Final Document of the tenth UN General Assembly 
Special session (1978), 17 ILM (1978), 1025. According to the 1976 Comprehensive Study, the 
security assurances are an important element of a nuclear weapon-free zone (above n. 3, Annex 
I, paras. 85 and 115). Some members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament 
argued however that the assurances by nuclear weapon states are not an indispensable 
requirement for the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone and should be given on a 
case-by-case basis (Bulgaria (ibid., Annex II, para. 101) and Mongolia (ibid., para. 129)). This 
position was criticised by the Swedish representative (ibid., para. 57). During the negotiations 
that would lead to the opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Mexico argued that the 
provision of security assurances by the nuclear powers was extremely useful but not necessary 
in order to establish the nuclear weapon-free zone, while Brazil took the opposite view and 
maintained that they were an essential and non-negotiable requirement (Mónica Serrano, 
Common Security in Latin America – The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco (London: Institute of Latin 
American Studies, 1992), 36-37). 
114  Georges Fischer, La non prolifération des armes nucléaires, 13 Annuaire 
français de droit international (1967), 88; Alfonso García Robles, Mesures de désarmement 
dans des zones particulières: le traité visant l’interdiction des armes nucléaires en Amérique 
latine, 133 Recueil des Cours (1971), 66. The nuclear states feared that the inclusion of security 
assurances in a General Assembly resolution might become a precedent in order to confer 
binding effect on those instruments (Serrano, above n. 113, 41). 
115  According to Rosen, however, “[g]iven that a politically if not legally binding 
NSA [Negative Security Assurance] has been given by the United States and other states in the 
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Opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons, the ICJ unanimously acknowledged that the 
threat and use of nuclear weapons must be consistent “with the requirements of the 
international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and 
rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under 
treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons”, where 
“specific obligations under treaties” can be interpreted as a reference to the protocols 
additional to the nuclear weapon-free zone treaties and “other undertakings” to the 
assurances contained in the unilateral declarations issued by the nuclear weapon states 
in 1995.116 
39. The security assurances must be distinguished in positive (by which the 
nuclear powers undertake to assist a non-nuclear weapon state should this be the 
victim of an attack carried out with nuclear weapons) and negative (by which the 
nuclear weapon states commit themselves not to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear weapon states). Only the latter are included in the protocols annexed to the 
Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, Bangkok and Semipalatinsk Treaties.117 However, 
                                                                                                                                      
NPT context, and that the P-5 have all committed to end nuclear weapons testing by signing 
the CTBT, P-5 participation in most of the current zones awaiting ratification does not add 
much to the security of regional states” (Mark E. Rosen, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones: Time 
for a Fresh Look, 8 Duke JCIL (1997-1998), 56-57). In his opinion, the security assurances 
encourage the use of weapons of mass destruction by “rogue states”. 
116  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 
1996, ICJ Reports 1996, dispositif, para. 105 (2) (D). Although with some language differences, 
in April 1995 France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States declared they would not use 
nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, except in case of an 
attack carried out by the non-nuclear weapon state allied to or in association with a nuclear 
weapon state against their territories, armed forces or a state towards which it exists a security 
commitment. China more comprehensively declared that it would not use nuclear weapons “at 
any time or under any circumstances” against non-nuclear weapon states (S/1995/261 (Russian 
Federation), S/1995/262 (United Kingdom), S/1995/263 (United States), S/1995/264 (France) 
and S/1995/265 (China), reprinted in Tariq Rauf, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs), 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (1997), 
<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/nwfz.htm>, 33-35). The declarations were endorsed by SC 
Res. 984 of 11 April 1995. In a Memorandum in connection with Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine’s accession to the NPT (5 December 1994), United States, United Kingdom and 
Russia (and France in a separate statement) also affirmed that they would not use nuclear 
weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state party to NPT “except in the case of an attack 
on themselves, their territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or their allies, by 
such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state” (ibid., 31). Finally, in 
October 2000, the five nuclear powers reaffirmed the positive and negative security assurances, 
as contained in the 1995 unilateral declarations and in SC Res. 984 (1995), with regard to 
Mongolia, that had unilaterally declared itself a denuclearized state in 1992 (Identical letters 
dated 27 October 2000 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Russian 
Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council, A/55/530 – S/2000/1052, 31 
October 2000, at 2). 
117  As observed, “[i]nscrire les garanties positives dans le cadre d’un accord sur 
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unlike the negative security assurances issued unilaterally by France, Russia, United 
Kingdom and United States,118 the protocols attached to the nuclear weapon-free 
zone treaties contain not only the undertaking not to use nuclear weapons, but also 
not to threaten their use.119 
40. Like the protocols additional to the Treaties of Rarotonga, Pelindaba and 
Bangkok and unlike Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Semipalatinsk 
Protocol is addressed only to the five nuclear powers under the NPT, which are 
expressly named.120 This is unfortunate, as the consequence is that India and Pakistan 
will not be expected to give any formal security assurances towards the Central Asian 
states, even though they possess nuclear weapons and, because of their geographical 
proximity, would be able to reach the region with their missiles. 
41. The beneficiaries of the assurances are the states parties to the nuclear 
weapon-free zone.121 The negative security assurances involve a commitment not to 
threaten or use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices not only against 
their territory, but also against their armed forces wherever they are located, even 
outside the nuclear weapon-free zone (for instance, a military base situated in a 
                                                                                                                                      
une zone exempte d’armes nucléaires revient à cette solution paradoxale que la nucléarisation 
garantit la dénucléarisation” (Szurek, above n. 1, 187). The positive security assurances are 
recalled in SC Res. 255 (19 June 1968) and Res. 984 (11 April 1995). 
118  See above n. 116. Only China committed itself not to threaten the use of 
nuclear weapons against denuclearized states. 
119  Marco Roscini, Threats of Armed Force and Contemporary International Law, 
54 Netherlands ILR (2007), 244. 
120  Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco does not list the states that are entitled 
to sign it, which allows the future adherence by de facto nuclear powers (Héctor Gros Espiell, 
El derecho de los tratados y el Tratado de Tlatelolco, 4 Anuario hispano-luso-americano de 
derecho internacional (1973), 324). 
121  The protocol annexed to the Bangkok Treaty prohibits the threat and use of 
nuclear weapons by the nuclear states not only against the parties to the treaty, but also “within 
the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone” (Art. 2). This entails the prohibition to launch 
missiles with a nuclear warhead from ships, submarines or aircraft located within the zone even 
if the target is situated outside, and also the prohibition to use nuclear weapons against means 
of transport (even if they belong to a nuclear weapon state) situated in the internal waters, 
territorial sea and, most importantly, exclusive economic zone of the states parties to the 
Bangkok Treaty. The nuclear weapon states might also be prevented from using nuclear 
weapons against a state that has not ratified the Bangkok Treaty but whose land, sea or air 
territory is included in its territorial scope of application. The United States has thus refused to 
sign the protocol unless this is amended (Romain Yakemtchouk, Zones dénucléarisées, 50 (4-5) 
Studia Diplomatica (1997), 55). A similar position has been taken by France (Joelle Bourgois, 
The Role Carried out by the Zones Exempt from Nuclear Arms, in Péricles Gasparini Alves 
and Daiana Belinda Cipollone (eds.), Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the 21st Century (New 
York and Geneva: United Nations, 1997), 126). In particular, the nuclear states have requested 
the deletion of the sentence “not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the 
Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone” (Norachit Sinhaseni, Southeast Asia Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone: Next Steps, 20 (1) Disarmament: A periodic review of the United Nations 
(1997), 67-68). 
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foreign territory or a warship on the high seas).122 On the other hand, it is unclear 
whether the Semipalatinsk Protocol prohibits the threat and use of nuclear weapons 
against those denuclearized states that detain other weapons of mass destruction, 
such as chemical or bacteriological arms: the fact that the prohibitions do not apply 
“under any circumstances” (as provided for instance in Art. I (1) of the 1993 
Chemical Weapons Convention) appears to support the conclusion that, in this case, 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons would not be inconsistent with the protocol. 
With regard to the African nuclear weapon-free zone, the Special Assistant to the US 
President for Arms Control stated that “Protocol I [of the Pelindaba Treaty] will not 
limit options available to the United States in response to an attack by an African 
Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone party using weapons of mass destruction”.123 This view 
also finds support in Judge Schwebel’s Dissenting opinion on the legality of nuclear 
weapons, where he maintains that “[a]s long as […] “rogue states” menace the world 
(whether they are or are not Parties to the NPT), it would be imprudent to set policy 
on the basis that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is unlawful ‘in any 
circumstance’. Indeed, it may not only be the rogue States but criminals or fanatics 
whose threats or acts of terrorism conceivably may require a nuclear deterrent or 
response”.124 
42. Apart from prohibiting the threat or use of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices against states parties to the Semipalatinsk Treaty, the 
protocol also requires the five nuclear weapon states not to contribute “to any act 
that constitutes a violation of the Treaty or this Protocol by Parties to them” (Article 
2). This assurance does not cover conduct carried out independently from an action 
of another party to the treaty or the protocol. The Protocols of Rarotonga and 
Bangkok employ an almost identical wording, while those of Tlatelolco and Pelindaba 
do not refer to the fact that the act constituting a violation must be committed by 
another contracting party. 
43. As to the prospects for the ratification of the Semipalatinsk Protocol by 
the nuclear states, Russia and China have already declared that they endorse the 
conclusion of the Semipalatinsk Treaty. 125  On the other hand, United Kingdom, 
                                                          
122  This conclusion finds some support in the declarations issued by the nuclear 
powers in 1995, according to which the security assurances may be withdrawn in case of an 
attack not only against the nuclear state’s territory, but also against its armed forces wherever 
they are stationed. 
123  The White House Special Briefing Topic: ANWFZ – The Africa Nuclear 
Weapons-Free Zone and the Signing of the Treaty of Pelindaba (11 April 1996), reprinted in 
Rosen, above n. 115, 51-52. 
124  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, above n. 116, p. 329. 
125  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Press Release, 8 
September 2006, 
<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/pdf_support/060908_russian_press_statement.pdf>; 
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang’s Comments on a Treaty on the Central Asia Nuclear 
Weapon Free Area to be Signed by the Five Central Asian Countries, 7 September 2006, 
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United States and France have withdrawn their support to the initiative because 
previous security arrangements like the 1992 Tashkent Collective Security Treaty 
might prejudice the application of the Semipalatinsk Treaty in case of armed 
conflict.126 Negotiations are thus still going on in order to secure the participation of 
all nuclear weapon states in the denuclearization of Central Asia, which is the reason 
why the protocol has not yet been opened for signature. 
 
VII. The Verification and Enforcement Mechanisms 
 
44. General Assembly Resolution 3472 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975 recalls that 
one of the essential elements of a nuclear weapon-free zone treaty is an international 
system of verification that ensures compliance with the denuclearization obligations. 
According to the 1976 Comprehensive Study, “[t]he viability of the nuclear-weapon-
free zone will largely depend on an effective system of verification and control that 
ensures the nuclear-weapon-free status of the zone”. The scope and nature of the 
system would necessarily differ from region to region and would depend upon the 
obligations assumed, but it should in any case extend to all nuclear activities of the 
states parties.127 The 1999 Guidelines also emphasize that “[a] nuclear-weapon-free 
zone should provide for the effective verification of compliance with the 
commitments made by the parties to the treaty, inter alia, through the application of 
full-scope IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities in the zone”, as provided in the 
IAEA documents INFCIRC/153 and INFCIRC/540.128 
45. Verification has been defined as “a process covering the entire set of 
measures aimed at enabling the Parties to an agreement to establish that the conduct 
of the other Parties is not incompatible with the obligations they have assumed under 
that agreement”.129 According to Krass, “[t]he verification process consists of two 
major components: monitoring, which is the primarily technical process of gathering 
and analyzing evidence on compliance behavior; and evaluation, which is the process 
of weighing and interpreting the evidence to determine whether or not a violation has 
                                                                                                                                      
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t270714.htm>. 
126  See above Section II, para. 9. United Kingdom, United States and France were 
the only states to vote against the adoption of GA Res. 61/88 of 6 December 2006 welcoming 
and supporting the opening for signature of the Semipalatinsk Treaty. 
127  1976 Comprehensive Study, above n. 3, Annex I, paras. 123, 128. The 
importance of an effective verification mechanism was emphasized by Czechoslovakia (ibid., 
Annex II, para. 47), Soviet Union (para. 72), Mongolia (para. 122) and United Kingdom (para. 
144). 
128  Report of the Disarmament Commission, above n. 5, para. 34.  
129  Serge Sur, Introduction, in Serge Sur (ed.), Disarmament and Arms Limitation 
Obligations. Problems of Compliance and Enforcement (Aldershot: Dartmouth; Geneva: 
UNIDIR, 1994), 2. In 1995, the UN Secretary-General published a study on verification 
(Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of 
verification. Report of the Secretary-General, A/50/377 and Corr. 1, A/52/269, A/54/166, 
A/54/555). 
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occurred”. 130  In the nuclear weapon-free zone treaties, these tasks are usually 
performed by two parallel mechanisms, one entrusted to the IAEA and the other to 
regional organs established by the treaty or – as in the Rarotonga Treaty – already 
existing. This two-pronged system is due to the fact that the IAEA safeguards 
agreements, conceived in relation to Article III of the NPT, were not meant to 
monitor compliance with the broader obligations contained in a nuclear weapon-free 
zone treaty. 131  The two mechanisms, thus, do not overlap, but have different 
competences: the IAEA detects the diversion of fissile materials from peaceful to 
military uses, while the regional organs monitor compliance with the other 
denuclearization obligations, in particular with the prohibition of stationing nuclear 
weapons within the zone.132  
46. In the Semipalatinsk Treaty, the role of the IAEA is outlined in Article 8, 
according to which – as already noted133 - states parties are under an obligation to 
conclude with the Agency and bring into force a comprehensive safeguard agreement 
(INFCIRC/153 (Corr.)) and an Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)) no later 
than eighteen months from the treaty’s entry into force. The IAEA safeguards 
constitute a confidence building measure and an early warning mechanism that might 
trigger responses by the international community in case of breach of non-
proliferation obligations. They include on-site inspections of declared and, under the 
Additional Protocol, undeclared sites, on-going monitoring and evaluation. With 
regard to the Central Asian states, if Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan have already concluded both the comprehensive safeguards agreement 
and the Additional Protocol with the IAEA, Kyrgyzstan has so far only signed the 
Protocol.134  
47. As to the regional verification mechanism referred to in Article 10 and 
described in the annex of the Semipalatinsk Treaty, it neither envisages the 
establishment of an international organisation nor relies on existing ones, but simply 
provides for annual consultative meetings to review compliance, with decisions taken 
by consensus.135 Extraordinary consultative meetings can also be convened at the 
                                                          
130  Allan S. Krass, Arms Control Treaty Verification, in Richard Dean Burns (ed.), 
Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 
Vol. I, 297. 
131  Xia Liping, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Lessons for Nonproliferation in 
Northeast Asia, 6 (4) The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1999), 84. 
132  Marie-Françoise Furet, Le désarmement nucléaire (Paris: Pedone, 1973), 181. 
The Rarotonga Treaty explicitly states that the regional mechanism, and in particular special 
inspections, “shall not duplicate safeguards procedures to be undertaken by the IAEA”  (Annex 
4, para. 5). 
133  Above Section II, para. 12. 
134  Source: <http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html>. 
135  It appears that earlier drafts of the treaty provided for the establishment of an 
organisation entrusted with verification, but these provisions were eventually deleted and do 
not appear in the final text (Parrish, above n. 8, 145). 
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request of any party (when the motion is seconded by two other parties) to discuss 
matters related to the implementation of the treaty and its violations. The need to 
convene the extraordinary meeting must be explained. The five nuclear weapon states 
under the NPT and the representatives of relevant international organisations can 
participate as observers with the consent of the states parties and the meetings’ 
decisions are reflected in outcome documents in Russian and, if needed, in English. A 
record of the consultative meetings may be transmitted, with the consent of all 
parties, to all interested international organisations as well as to the observers. One 
cannot however fail to note that, although the regular meetings of the parties might 
play a positive role and “attenuate rivalries among the countries in the region and 
foster the good neighbourly relations necessary for the planned regional cooperative 
undertakings in the field of environmental security”,136 the regional machinery could 
have been more elaborate and intrusive, in particular by establishing verification 
organs with the authority to conduct inspections as in the other nuclear weapon-free 
zone treaties.137 
48. If a violation of the nuclear weapon-free zone treaty is detected through 
the mechanisms described above, the breached obligation must be enforced so that 
compliance is ensured. Even though there is no specific enforcement mechanism 
envisaged in the Semipalatinsk Treaty, enforcement could still be achieved in two 
ways: multilaterally or unilaterally. With regard to the former, the states parties might 
react to a violation in the framework of a competent international organisation, such 
as by resorting to the UN Security Council or General Assembly.138 Indeed, several 
Security Council resolutions have qualified the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and of their means of delivery as a threat to international peace and 
security. 139  In the Semipalatinsk Treaty, no role of the UN main organs in the 
enforcement process is expressly envisaged, which marks a difference with other 
nuclear weapon-free zone treaties. However, this would not prevent the Security 
Council from dealing with a violation of the denuclearization regime should this be 
                                                          
136  Goldblat, above n. 11, 32. 
137  On the inspection mechanisms in the other nuclear weapon-free zone treaties, 
see Roscini, above n. 5, 355-358. 
138  James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 302. The above mentioned 
Comprehensive Study refers to the need to coordinate the nuclear weapon-free zone treaties 
with the UN collective security system (1976 Comprehensive Study, above n. 3, Annex I, paras. 
123, 135, 144.). 
139  See SC Res. 825 of 11 May 1993 (linking “progress in non-proliferation” to the 
maintenance of international peace and security) and the more explicit Resolutions 1540 of 28 
April 2004, 1695 of 15 July 2006 and 1718 of 14 October 2006. In Res. 1540, the Council also 
affirmed “its resolve to take appropriate actions against any threat to international peace and 
security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their 
means of delivery”. For a critical discussion of Res. 1540, see Daniel H. Joyner, Non-
proliferation Law and the United Nations System: Resolution 1540 and the Limits of the Power 
of the Security Council, 20 Leiden JIL (2007), 508-515. 
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qualified as a threat to the peace: even in the absence of a specific provision 
contained in a treaty, any UN member state (and even a non-member which is a party 
to the dispute and accepts to settle it peacefully) can bring any dispute, or situation 
which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, to the attention of 
the Security Council or of the General Assembly (Article 35 of the UN Charter). The 
IAEA Board of Governors might also report to the Security Council and to the 
General Assembly cases of non-compliance with obligations towards the IAEA 
(Article XII (C) of the IAEA Statute). 
49. States parties might also react unilaterally to a breach of the 
denuclearization regime and adopt countermeasures under the conditions provided in 
customary international law. 140  In particular, the state party taking the 
countermeasure might react in kind and breach the same provision initially violated 
by the wrongdoer providing that this obligation is not erga omnes partes. 141 
Furthermore, the state party might breach other treaties in force with the wrongdoer, 
such as those providing for economic cooperation. In any case, the limits highlighted 
in Articles 50 and 51 of the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, which reflect 
customary international law, must be respected. In particular, Article 50 provides that 
a state taking countermeasures is not relieved from fulfilling its obligations “under 
any dispute settlement procedure applicable between it and the responsible State”. In 
this context, Article 11 of the Semipalatinsk Treaty should be recalled, as it contains 
the obligation to settle disputes involving the interpretation or application of the 
treaty “through negotiations or by any other means as may be deemed necessary by 
the Parties”. 
 
VIII. Conclusions 
 
50. The opening for signature of the Semipalatinsk Treaty marks the successful 
conclusion of the negotiations for the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in 
Central Asia, the first situated entirely in the Northern emisphere and sharing borders 
with two nuclear weapon states. Although it is true that – as Goldblat suggests – “this 
treaty may help build up geopolitical stability and security in Central Asia” and is thus 
“a valuable asset for the cause of non-proliferation”,142 it contains however lights and 
                                                          
140  See Roscini, above n. 5, 370-381. 
141  On the erga omnes partes character of certain obligations contained in the 
Semipalatinsk Treaty, see above Section V, para. 32. 
142  Goldblat, above n. 11, 32. According to Enkhsaikhan, the establishment of the 
Central Asian nuclear weapon-free zone might have “a positive impact on maintaining and 
strengthening the overall balance and stability in the subregion and its strategically important 
adjacent areas” (Jargalsaikhany Enkhsaikhan, Central Asia – Future Perspectives, in Gasparini 
Alves and Cipollone, above n. 121, 97). The First Deputy Foreign Minister of Kyrgyzstan also 
observed that “if implemented, this initiative would make for deep positive movements on the 
global, regional and subregional levels, as well as in the sphere of bilateral relations of countries 
in our region” (Dzhekshenkulov, above n. 48, 54). 
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shadows. It is the first of its kind to require the states parties to comply with the 
CTBT and the Additional Protocol on IAEA strengthened safeguards. It prohibits 
not only ready for use nuclear explosive devices, but also their components. It is the 
only nuclear weapon-free zone treaty providing for an obligation of assistance in the 
efforts toward the rehabilitation of radioactively contaminated territories. The 
obligation of physical protection of nuclear material, facilities and equipment included 
in Article 9 could also make the Semipalatinsk Treaty an effective tool against the risk 
of nuclear terrorism. Finally, unlike in the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and 
Bangkok, military nuclear research is expressly prohibited. 
51. On the downside, the verification mechanism provided in the annex is 
disappointing, as it only provides for consultative meetings to review compliance, 
with decisions taken by consensus. Furthermore, there is no protocol attached to the 
Semipalatinsk Treaty by the ratification of which the nuclear weapon states commit 
themselves not to carry out nuclear test explosions within the zone, and the disposal 
of a state party’s radioactive waste in its own territory is not prohibited. The list of 
provisions contained in other nuclear weapon-free zone treaties but not in the 
Semipalatinsk Treaty also includes the prohibition of armed attack against nuclear 
installations situated within the zone, the obligation to declare, dismantle and destroy 
or convert nuclear explosive devices and facilities for their manufacture, and the 
obligation to accede to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. 
52. However, even though the Semipalatinsk Treaty is far from being perfect, 
one should see the glass half full, and not half empty. Each nuclear weapon-free zone 
treaty necessarily reflects the specific characteristics of the region to which it applies 
and, if it aims to be successful, has to reach a compromise between the interests of 
the regional states and those of the nuclear powers. After years of gestation, the 
Semipalatinsk Treaty has finally been opened for signature. The perfect is sometimes 
the enemy of the good. 
